Andrew W Howat, Ph. D
Associate Professor of Philosophy
I was born in Scotland and studied philosophy as an undergraduate in Edinburgh with terrific Professors like Rae Langton, Richard Holton, Alexander Bird, and Timothy Williamson. I did my PhD in Sheffield with Chris Hookway and Rob Hopkins (now at NYU). My dissertation defended the idea that truth is a response-dependent concept and that this is a novel way to frame and defend philosophical pragmatism and its critique of metaphysical realism. I arrived at CSUF in 2011 as an Assistant Professor. I was promoted to Associate Professor in 2017. I regularly teach metaphysics, philosophy of language, upper- and lower-division logic classes, and American Philosophy / pragmatism (particularly that of C.S. Peirce).
2008, Ph.D, University of Sheffield
2001, M.A. (Hons), University of Edinburgh
Metaphysics; Language; Epistemology; American Pragmatism (esp. C.S. Peirce)
Courses Regularly Taught
PHIL 420 (Metaphysics), PHIL 435 (Philosophy of Language), PHIL368 (Symbolic Logic), PHIL 106 (Introduction to Logic), PHIL 100 (Introduction to Philosophy).
Commentary on Robert Lane’s ‘Peirce on Realism and Idealism’, Syndicate Network, Posted 7/4/19, [URL]
Howat, A. (2018) 'Misak's Peirce and Pragmatism's Metaphysical Commitments.' Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 54 (3): 378-394.
Howat, A. W. (2018) 'Constituting Assertion: A Pragmatist Critique of Horwich's "Truth"', Synthese, Special Issue, 195 (3), 935-954 (Wright, C. and Ulatowski, J. (Eds)).
Howat, A. W. (2015) 'Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth', Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 51, no. 4 (2015): 419-43.
Howat, A. (2014) 'Peirce on Grounding the Laws of Logic
' in Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society, Vol. 50, No. 4, 480-500.
Howat, A.W. (2014) 'Prospects for Peircean Truth ' in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44, Issue 3-4.
Howat, A.W. (2013) ‘Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth’ in Erkenntnis, 78 (2): 451-468
Howat, A.W. (2011). 'Shallow Versus Deep Response-Dependence '. Philosophical Studies: Volume 156, Issue 2 (2011), Page 155-172.
My primary research goal is to generate a more constructive dialogue between mainstream M&E and the pragmatist tradition (broadly construed). My primary case study is theories of truth - I argue in favor of a broadly anti-representationalist, pragmatist conception inspired by the work of Chris Hookway, Cheryl Misak, Huw Price, and others. Contrary to the stereotype of pragmatists as vehemently anti-metaphysics, I am exploring the possibility that a form of metaphysics might play a role in vindicating the basic logical and epistemic principles on which we rely when we inquire, whether in the natural sciences or in other domains. In recent years I have thus begun to take an interest in free will and the nature/extent of rational self-control - that is, our capacity to exert some measure of voluntary, long-term control over what we believe, and to pursue beliefs that are true, rather than those that best confirm our prejudices, or mesh with our ideology.
Thursdays 2:15-4:15 p.m.
Current Course Schedule
Metaphysics (PHIL 420)
M/W 10:00 a.m.
Symbolic Logic (PHIL 368)
M/W 11:30 a.m.
Intro to Logic
M/W @ 1 p.m.
Next Semester Course Schedule
MW @ 10:00
Symbolic Logic 368
MW @ 11:30
Intro to Logic 106
MW @ 1:00